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Poverty is not a natural phenomenon but the result of human-made policies and 
institutions, therefore the solution to the problem of poverty must also be sought in social, 
economic and political policies and institutions. Furthermore poverty is a global social 
scar, not merely in the sense that it is present in some form in every corner of the world, 
but because it is the product of global affairs and institutions. It follows that we must look 
at global policies for a remedy. This chapter proposes a policy to tackle the problem of 
global poverty. In putting forward our policy proposal, the Global Luxuries Tax (GLT), 
we are aware that the challenge of global poverty is too complex and entrenched in the 
basic structure of global society to harbour the hope of a quick-fix solution. We put 
forward this proposal in the hope that the GLT can play some role, albeit small, in 
moving the agenda in the right direction. 
 The first part of the chapter will highlight two main pitfalls faced by any potential 
solution to the problem of global poverty; these are objections that any policy solution 
must be able to avoid or respond to if it is to be taken seriously. The second and third 
parts will introduce the idea of a Global Luxuries Tax, first in theory and then in practice. 
In the final part some objections to the GLT will be considered, and appeased. 
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ONE OF MANY. 
 
A number of ingenious solutions to the problem of global poverty have been put forward 
in recent years. Apart from the well-trodden path of raising domestic taxes to subsidize a 
1% GDP redistribution of resources from the wealthy nations to the poorer nations, other 
propositions include the Global Resources Dividend (Pogge 2008 and 2011); the Global 
Fund (Steiner 2011); the Global Share (Casal 2011); extensive reforms of the global tax 
system (Brock 2008); or even free-movement across borders (Barry and Goodin 1992). 
All of the above are important contributions to the debate, and all contain valid intuitions 
that should not be dismissed lightly. 
 As one might expect, there is no unanimous agreement as to which of these 
solutions is likely to bring the best results. They all have their strengths but also their 
alleged weaknesses. There is a case to be made for advocating a pluralist approach 
whereby all these solutions are defended, recommended, and to the best of our ability 
implemented. The assumption being that these solutions can complement one another, the 
shortcomings of one policy being compensated by the strength of an alternative policy, 
making each policy only one factor in a pluralist, comprehensive, multi-pronged solution. 
 Pogge’s Global Resources Dividend (GRD) is arguably the most talk about 
proposal on the table at the moment, and rightly so. Pogge envisages the GRD as a levy 
paid by resource extracting firms at source: as they extract resources, they pay a certain 
amount to a world fund. There is something normatively significant about the GRD. 
Pogge is to be praised not only for suggesting an ingenious solution to the problem of 
 3 
global poverty, but for starting from the assumption, too often conveniently neglected by 
champions of the status quo, that fairness demands some form of compensation from 
those who make more extensive use of the planet’s resources to those who, involuntarily, 
use very little.  
 This proposal is more moderate, or less radical, than the view that holds that all 
natural resources belong to everyone, globally, to an equal degree, therefore we should 
not assume that artificial constructs such as sovereign nation states have a prior moral 
claim over the full extent of all the natural resources. This position was reiterated in 1994 
by Hillel Steiner in An Essay on Rights, in his account of the Global Fund, which in many 
ways can be seen as a precursor to the GRD.1 Following Locke’s claim that ‘the earth, 
and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, Steiner (1994, 236) argues for “an equal 
share of initially unowned things”. What Steiner is telling us here is that we don’t have to 
go along with the widely held assumption, never justified but seldom challenged, that the 
natural resources below the ground are the legal and moral rightful ownership of the 
arbitrary political outfit above the ground. 
 In this paper we are going to bypass the Steiner-Pogge controversy regarding the 
moral (and legal) ownership of unused natural resources, not because it is not an 
important debate, since it clearly is, but merely because our proposal does not rest on the 
resolution of this dispute. Instead, we want to highlight two potentially problematic issues 
that any global policy intent on alleviating global poverty ought to be sensitive to: the 
Unintended Consequences Objection, and the Implementation Objection. 
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The Unintended Consequences Objection. This objection suggests that some solutions 
may not be as effective as it may seem at first, since the policy has unintended 
consequences that take away from its merits. For example a policy may trigger 
inflationary pressure which would indent on the funds raised for the benefit of the global 
poor. The GRD is possibly susceptible to this line of critique. Let’s assume that GRD 
imposes a $3 dividend on every barrel of oil that is extracted from the ground. The $3 
will in turn be passed on to the consumers, who will be asked to pay more for the petrol 
they buy. But since oil is needed for the production of many other goods, the unintended 
consequence of the GRD is that it will add inflationary pressure on the cost of basic 
goods worldwide. 
 The global price of food is a case in point. There is ample empirical evidence to 
suggest that the price of food worldwide follows closely, and is determined by, the price 
of crude oil. The World Bank calculated that food prices increased by 8% from 
December 2011 to March 2012, and they quote higher oil prices as a key factor.2 As 
World Bank Vice President for Poverty Reduction and Economic Management (PREM) 
Otaviano Canuto warns us: “After four months of consecutive price declines, food prices 
are on the rise again threatening the food security of millions of people. Putting food first 
must remain a priority for the international community and in our work in developing 
countries.” According to the quarterly Food Price Watch report, maize prices increased 
by 9 percent, soybean oil by 7 percent, wheat by 6 percent, and sugar by 5 percent. Crude 
oil prices rose by 13 percent.3 The risk here is that GRD will increase the price of crude 
oil, which in turn will generate inflationary pressures on food and other basic products. 
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As a result, those worst affected by the food price rise are precisely the people that the 
GRD is supposed to help in the first place, namely the global poor. 
 The unintended consequences of inflationary pressures generated by the GRD are 
not a fatal blow to Pogge’s policy. It may be possible for measures to be put in place to 
counteract these tendencies and prevent the price of basic goods to raise more than is 
warranted. Nevertheless, the Unintended Consequences Objection remains a worry, if 
only because it threatens to make the GRD less effective than it might seem at first. The 
same objection could also apply to other possible solutions. 
 
The Implementation Objection. Any policy recommendation being put forward as a 
solution to the problem of global poverty must not only be within the scope of 
international politics as it operates today, but it should also be conceivable to put it in 
practice. One problem is to work out exactly who, on grounds of justice, should pay for 
the dividend. If the global poverty tax takes the form of a tax on the extraction of natural 
resources, like in the case of the GRD, it is imperative to work out in detail exactly where 
the burden of the GRD will fall. A related issue is how to ensure that this tax applies 
universally, without exceptions. For example, given the existence of financial tax havens 
around the world, there is reason to worry about potential global poverty tax havens too. 
Another  
 
THE GLOBAL LUXURIES TAX IN THEORY. 
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The GLT starts from the basic assumption that the world is divided into two groups of 
people: the global poor and the global wealthy. These two groups are differentiated by 
the fact that while the global poor have only enough resources to cover their basic needs 
(and often not even that), the global wealthy have at their disposal enough resources to 
cover their basic needs and also enjoy luxuries. The assumption behind the GLT is that 
the burden to do something about global poverty should fall, first and foremost, on those 
with an overabundance of resources, namely the global wealthy. 
 The reason for expecting the global wealthy to bear the burden when it comes to 
helping the global poor should be obvious to many, one would hope, but it may 
nevertheless be necessary to briefly reiterate the argument. Even a rudimentary 
knowledge of world history should be sufficient to remind us that anyone today who has 
resources at their disposal to spend on luxuries has come upon those resources in a way 
that somewhere, in the past, involved an injustice. Of course this does not mean that all 
the wealthy people in the world are criminals; that would be absurd, and inaccurate. We 
are merely suggesting that the global wealthy are lucky, to the extent that they find 
themselves at the end of a line of descendants that has benefitted from historical injustice 
more than it has suffered from it. As Thomas Piketty (2014) has demonstrated on 
formidable empirical grounds with devastating clarity and rigour, wealth (and capital) has 
a tendency to multiply over time, and grows faster than other forms of income. 
Furthermore as Martin O’neill (2007) points out it also passes down the family line in a 
way that is arbitrary and therefore ultimately unjustified.  
The key question is how, and when, the original bundle of resources that has been 
passed down from benefactor to benefactor, generating the inequality between the global 
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poor and the global wealthy, was originally acquired. We will never know of course, and 
no one can trace their wealth to that moment in time which Robert Nozick refers to as the 
‘initial acquisition’. But while historical accuracy on individual wealth accumulation will 
always remain a mystery, there is a great deal we know about historical injustice.4 The 
wealth of the industrialized countries has been accumulated over the centuries in no small 
part thanks to a long history of colonization, imperialism, slavery and military expansion. 
It is much too convenient to lay claim over our individual wealth today while forgetting 
all the injustice of yesterday. So, to use Nozick’s terminology once again, targeting the 
global wealthy is merely the simplest way to enforce some semblance of rectification of 
injustice. Another way of stating this point is that the burden of proof should be on those 
who claim or believe that they have acquired their wealth via a fair initial acquisition, not 
on those who want to justify the redistribution of resources.5 
 A great deal more can and ought to be said about historical global injustice as a 
determining cause of contemporary inequality and poverty, but that is a debate for 
another day. However even if we assume the validity of this initial supposition, and we 
accept that the global wealthy should be at the forefront of the efforts to solve the 
problem of global poverty, the mechanism according to which wealth is to be 
appropriated from the global wealthy and redistributed to the global poor needs 
elucidation. The GLT is a policy that could perform this redistributive maneuver. 
 The idea behind the GLT is simple: this is a levy collected whenever a person, 
wherever they happen to live (bar a few exceptions), accesses a certain luxury. The 
money collected will go towards a Global Poverty Fund to be used to alleviate the worst 
cases of global poverty.6 The tax is a miniscule percentage of the price of the good or 
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service being purchased, so that the GLT raises money for the Global Poverty Tax by 
virtue of the high number of transaction taking place.  
As the name suggests, there are three aspects of this policy that require further 
explanation: What do we mean by ‘tax’? Why does it target ‘luxuries’? And in what 
sense is it ‘global’? The global dimension of the GLT should be obvious, given the 
growing process of international integration, especially on economic and financial levels. 
This is nothing new of course: trade and expansion has been a feature of the world ever 
since technology made it possible for people and goods to be transported, and all great 
empires throughout history were built on strategies spanning beyond the domestic sphere, 
often of a violent nature. The nature and sources of poverty today is not something that 
can be understood exclusively at the local level, therefore the solution to this problem 
must also be sought at a supranational level. Poverty is caused by our global institutional 
arrangements, as Thomas Pogge argues, in fact current global institutional designs are the 
major impediment to radical changes that would eradicate global poverty. The GLT has 
global aspirations not only in recognition of the global nature of the causes of poverty 
today, but also as a reminder that historically wealth accumulation came about as a result 
of acts of international injustice: imperialism, colonialism, slavery and military 
expansion.   
 With the risk of making this proposal unpopular, it is worth emphasizing that the 
GLT is a tax. We think this is a positive feature of the scheme, as the ability to make a 
monetary payment for public purposes should be seen in a positive light. Too much has 
been made in recent years of Nozick’s melodramatic claim that taxation is on a par with 
forced labour. There is another way to think about taxation, which stems from the 
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principle of solidarity rather than individual egoism: namely, that a tax is a contribution 
towards the common good. 
One of the advantages of this scheme is that the tax in question is progressive, to 
the extent that those who access luxuries repeatedly will contribute more to the GLT than 
those who do so less frequently, if at all.7 Furthermore, there is a voluntary element to 
this type of taxation, as one is required to make the payment only when they choose to 
purchase certain luxury goods. Someone who doesn’t want to pay this tax has the option 
of not indulging in the purchase and consumption of luxuries.   
Finally, by directing its attention towards the global wealthy, the GLT targets the 
consumption of luxuries. This requires that we agree on the definition of a ‘luxury’, and 
on a list of luxuries to be taxed. The concept of luxury has a long history. As Christopher 
Berry (1994) explains, over the centuries luxuries have been associated with good that are 
refined and positively pleasing, goods that have a transient stratus, good that are 
superfluous, and goods that enjoy high income elasticity of demand. We can perhaps go 
along with Berry (1994, 41) and adopt what he calls ‘almost a definition’ of luxury: “a 
luxury good is a widely desired (because not yet generally attained) good that is believed 
to be ‘pleasing’, and the general desirability of which is explained by it being a specific 
need”. The ‘specific need’ in question is not to be confused with a ‘basic need’. Another 
way of distinguishing luxury goods from other goods is that we have a ‘categorical 
desire’ to satisfy certain specific needs, in the sense of the term used by Bernard Williams 
(1973), but not for basic needs. 
The fact that certain luxuries are being taxes should not be interpreted as a 
punitive measure. This is not like a tax on alcohol or tobacco, where the aim of the tax 
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(apart from raising money for the public coffers) is to give an incentive to people to stop 
consuming certain goods. The luxuries being taxed by the GLT are not morally or 
medically problematic, or at least not more so than any other good being consumed, and 
the tax is not intended to act as a disincentive. On the contrary the idea behind the GLT is 
that the tax is so small that it will not make a difference to the consumer, so that they will 
continue to buy the luxury, and in the process raise more funds for the global poor. 
 To recap, the GLT has a global reach, it targets luxuries, and it generates funds for 
the global poor by way of taxing the global wealthy. Before we look at some practical 
implications of this tax, it is necessary to make a further distinction between a Universal 
GLT and a Partial (or Restricted) GLT. A Universal GLT applies to everyone across the 
globe that enjoys certain luxuries, even if the person in question lives among the global 
poor. A Partial GLT applies only to certain areas of the world, namely those countries 
where the GDP is above a certain threshold. The GLT entails both Universal and a Partial 
component, depending on the luxury. A Universal GLT targets the individual (and their 
wealth) wherever they happen to be, indeed the majority of luxuries being taxed by the 
GLT are Universal. The GLT is not a tax on rich states, but on the consumption of rich 
individuals. As we shall see, the fact that it does not rely on the compliance of a national 
government for its implementation, and success, is crucially important. This is one of 
GLT’s main attractions. At the same time, in the case of certain luxuries, it may be 
desirable to make further distinctions based on location, in which case it becomes a case 
of a Partial GLT. 
   
THE GLOBAL LUXURIES TAX IN PRACTICE. 
 11 
 
On the basis of this working definition of what constitutes a luxury, we can now 
speculate on the list of luxuries to be taxed by the GLT. After all, the GLT will work if 
and only if we agree on a list of goods, deemed to be luxuries, which can be the subject 
of the global tax.  
 The luxury goods to be taxed by the GLT are not those that come to mind when 
we think of luxuries. This is not about taxing products and services that are expensive 
simply because they are expensive. The GLT is not interested in exclusive items of food, 
drink, clothes and jewelry so expensive that they can be enjoyed only by the very few, or 
the very foolish. Instead, two criteria determine the items to be taxed by a GLT. 
 First, because the tax is going to be extremely small, the goods and services being 
taxed will generate revenue for the Global Poverty Fund as a consequence of the high 
demand they enjoy, and therefore the subsequent high volume of transactions. From that 
point of view the luxuries of the GLT are the exact opposite of the very expensive 
(because very rare) goods and services that hardly anyone can afford to enjoy.  
 Secondly, the GLT will want to tax goods and services that are not already the 
subject of taxes at the national level. In other words the GLT should not compete with 
nation states for the right to tax certain goods. This is important because consumers 
should not be subjected to multiple regimes of taxation, furthermore it is important that 
people know that when they pay a GLT they are making a contribution towards the end 
of global poverty. 
  With these two criteria in mind it is possible to make a stab at a list of potential 
luxuries to be taxed by the GLT. Needless to say this exercise is merely speculative, in 
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the sense that its aim is merely to act as a starting point for discussion, therefore we leave 
open the possibility for more items to be added (and perhaps a few subtracted) from this 
list. 
 
UNIVERSAL GLT PARTIAL GLT 
• Air Travel • Procreations 
• Financial Transactions • Texting on Mobile Phones 
 
 We will start with the list of Universal GLT, as these do not allow for exceptions. 





In the 21st century we all travel via airplanes more than we ever did before and a lot more 
than we strictly need to, with half a million people in the air at any one time. Bar a few 
exceptions, the bulk of air travel is either for reasons of work or leisure. The latter has 
grown at a much faster rate than the former over the last 50 years, when going abroad for 
a holiday was a prerogative of a very small selected (lucky) few. Anyone today who gets 
on an airplane to go on vacation is clearly exercising their desire for a luxury good, hence 
they would be a good candidate for contributing to the GLT. Accidently, this will also go 
some way towards solving the moral dilemma, originally set by Ted Honderich, whether 
someone should go on holiday in Venice or give the money to Oxfam instead. Honderich 
wants to convince us to forego the trip to Venice, but of course few people are prepared 
to make that kind of sacrifice, and understandably so. The GLT on air travel allows us to 
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go on vacation to Venice, enjoy the city immortalized to Canaletto, while in the process 
contributing to the solution of global poverty. A rare case of having your moral cake and 
eat it too. 
 Adding US$5 per air ticket would generate a considerable source of revenue for 
the Global Poor. If we take the EU as an example, between 2009 and 2010 the total 
number of passengers travelling by air in the EU increased to 777 million. If each 
passenger was charged an extra $5 for the pleasure and convenience of travelling by air, 
this tax alone would contribute US$3885 million to the global fund.8 
 Of course not everyone travels for pleasure. There are many who also travel for 
work, in which case it might seem odd to include their activity as a luxury. These 
concerns can easily be countered. First of all, adding US$5 per air ticket will not make 
much difference to business travelers, since in the majority of cases those who travel for 
work related reasons don’t pay for their travels out of their own pocket, instead the 
business they represent picks up the bill. In fact, there is an argument to be made that 
anyone travelling business class should pay an added global luxury tax of US$30. 
 Secondly, it could be argued that adding air travel to GLT may have the 
unintended consequence of giving an incentive for businesses to find an alternative to 
sending their employees on long journeys that require taking to the air, for example by 
investing in video-conferencing technology. If this was indeed an unintended 
consequence of a GLT on air travel, then this development is to be welcomed, as it would 
contribute towards cutting carbon emissions and therefore make a positive impact on the 
environment, and indirectly on the global poor who are most at risk from climate change. 
The fact that video-conferencing technology is an alternative to work-related air travel 
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only strengthens the argument that air travel is a luxury, in the sense that a luxury good is 
superfluous, something we can do without. Whether it is for leisure or for business, air 




The idea of an international tax on financial transactions has been on the agenda for a 
while, for example in the form of a Tobin Tax. Originally defined as a tax on all spot 
currency conversions, the Tobin Tax is now no longer confined to the currency markets, 
but includes trading in shares, bonds and derivatives.9 
 It may be necessary to distinguish between two types of financial transactions, 
namely transactions that are necessary and those that are speculative. Necessary 
Transaction are those performed by any citizen in the modern world, for example buying 
foreign currency - perhaps before travelling by air to an academic conference in Venice. 
The levy on these transactions can be minimal, so much so that one would not even 
notice this at the end of the month, although they would add up. After all, units are made 
up by fractions, so even an insignificant amount of tax on single transaction, even as 
small as US$0.05 can make a difference. The money for the global fund will be generated 
by the volume of transactions, so that the ordinary citizen will not even notice they are 
being taxed. 
 The GLT on financial transactions undertaken for speculative reasons would be 
much greater, in part because the motivation behind the transaction is not a necessity 
(hence by definition a luxury), and in part due to the much higher number of transactions 
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incurred by financial institutions. It is crucial that GLT on financial transactions are 
Universal rather than Partial, in order to avoid the risk of Global Luxury Tax havens in 
remote parts of the world. 
 It is unlikely that the GLT on financial transactions will have the unintended 
consequence of giving individuals and institutions an incentive to hold back from doing a 
transaction, since the cost per transaction will be extremely small, and even the higher tax 
on speculative transactions levied will not deter the investors, given that financial 
institutions are among the richest groups in the world. Also, in a perverse way global 
financial institutions may even welcome a GLT on financial transactions, as this would 
make it possible for them to take the moral high-ground, and remind anyone listening, 
especially the activists of the Occupy Movement, that they are not always the bad guys, 
instead they are doing their part to help solve the problem of global poverty. For 




Apart from Universal GLT, we must also consider Partial GLT. These are taxes that are 
levied only in certain parts of the world, specifically countries that enjoy a GDP per 
capita above a certain threshold.10 According to the International Monetary Fund, in 
2010-11, the country with the highest GDP per capita is Luxembourg (US$160,000) and 
the one with the lowest is the Democratic Republic of the Congo (US$217). For example, 
we could draw the line at US$10,000 per capita, hence Malaysia would be above the line 
at US$10,085 and Lebanon would be below the line at US$9,862.  
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 All the countries within the EU are above this threshold. According to Eurostat, 
approximately 5.4 million children were born each year in the 27 countries of the 
European Union between 2008 and 2010. The GLT on procreation would tax each family 
for the birth of their child, perhaps as little as US$5. This would generate 
US$270,000,000 for the global fund from the EU alone.  
The basic assumption behind this tax is that choosing to have a child is a luxury. 
This idea has a long history, indeed as Marx argued in his Economic and Philosophical 
Manuscripts of 1844: “There are too many people. Even the existence of men is a pure 
luxury; and if the worker is ‘ethical’, he will be sparing in procreation”. More recently 
Paula Casal and Andrew Williams (1995) convincingly argue that procreation may cause 
a public bad, since adding another human being on the planet will only worsen resource 
scarcities, in which case it may be legitimate to tax those who have children.11 It may 
seem counterintuitive to classify having a baby as a luxury, since procreation is an 
integral part of the natural cycle, and what is natural cannot be a luxury. But closer 
analysis suggests otherwise. Even if one were to accept the dubious claim that having a 
family is a human need, it is important to distinguish between having a family and having 
a baby (or procreating). Having a baby is only one way to have a family; another way of 
having a family is by adoption. The difference between procreation and adoption is 
morally significant. In an era defined by overpopulation each addition to the human race 
carries negative externalities on non-consenting third parties, which is why having a baby 
should be taxed, while adopting a baby should not. In fact, a case could be made for 
parents to be given a financial incentive to adopt rather than procreate. 
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 The GLT on procreation may need to be more nuanced than some of the 
Universal GLT we have considered so far, since it may not apply across the board as 
easily as a tax on air travel. For example, it may be desirable to exempt some people from 
the GLT on procreation. One group that should be exempt from GLT is victims of rape, 
for obvious reasons, or families whose newborn dies within the first year. Another group 
is women who live in countries where abortion is illegal, since they don’t have the option 
of interrupting their pregnancy, although in such cases there may be some merit in 
making governments of countries where abortion is illegal pay for the GLT on 




Mobile phones are another modern luxury, even though anyone under the age of 20 will 
probably vehemently object. Just because mobile phones have made modes of 
communication terribly convenient, indeed too convenient sometimes, it doesn’t mean 
that they are not a luxury. We know that they are a luxury because it is possible to live 
without mobile phones (many of us did until recently, and a few still do), and our general 
proclivity to use our mobile phones incessantly is nothing more than a desire to satisfy a 
yearning, not a basic need. 
 The GLT on mobile phones would work by adding an almost insignificant charge 
on every text message sent via mobile phone, say US$0.01 per message. When one 
considers that in 2003 in Europe 16 billion messages were sent each month, that in 2009 
in the USA 152 billion texts were sent each month (an average of 534 messages per 
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subscriber per month), and that in China in 2007 about 700 billion messages were sent, 
the GLT on mobile phones could prove to be very lucrative for a global fund. 
 As in the case for procreation, there are good reasons for making this a partial tax, 
since some groups should be excluded from paying it. In Africa for example there is 
simply no alternative to using mobile phones, since the network of landlines is extremely 
small and inadequate. It would be unfair to tax people for using a form of technology 
where no alternative exists. This is why mobile telephony is truly revolutionary in 
Africa.12 The fact that there are apps widely used in Africa for monitoring the gestation 
periods of dairy cows, and likely birth dates of calves (iCow), and for verifying the 
legitimacy of medicines, and check for expiry dates, given that Africa can be a dumping 
ground for counterfeit pharmaceuticals (mPedigree), suggests that mobiles phones 
perform a vital function in African society.13 
 But apart from these exceptions, the rule should be that anyone who texts could 
make a contribution to the global fund. The contribution per person would be minimal, 
even for the most enthusiastic text users, but it could make a considerable impact in the 
fight against global poverty. For example in the Republic of Ireland in 2006 on average 
114 messages were sent per person per month. At US$0.01 per text that would mean 
US$1.14 per person per month.14 A small cost for the average Irish person, but a potential 
life-safer in many parts of the world. 
 
OBJECTIONS TO THE GLOBAL LUXURIES TAX. 
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If GLT is to be a serious contender as one of the policies that could, if enacted, make a 
difference to world poverty, then any potential weaknesses must come under scrutiny. In 
Part I above it was suggested that any solution to global poverty is susceptible to two 
objections: the Unintended Consequences Objection and the Implementation Objection. 
We must consider how the GLT fares on these two issues. 
The first issue is the Unintended Consequences Objection, namely the idea that 
this tax would not help the global poor as much as we may anticipate. As we saw in Part 
I, the unintended consequence of Pogge’s GRD is that it would have inflationary pressure 
on global prices, therefore the money raised and passed on to the global poor would not 
have the purchasing power required to push people out of the poverty trap. Are there 
similar unintended consequences to the GLT? We don’t think so, or at least not to the 
same extent compared to the GRD. There is no reason to suspect that GLT will have the 
same impact on general prices, since the GLT taxes luxuries. Unlike natural resources, 
luxuries do not feed into the production line of other goods. Thus, the fact that the price 
of a luxury like airfare or financial transactions or a text on a mobile phone or a new baby 
goes up will not affect the price of other goods. Compared to GRD, the GLT has the 
advantage of taxing consumers at the moment when goods are being purchased and 
enjoyed (or in the case of procreation at the moment when a child is born), which 
suggests that the tax will affect only those targeted by the GLT, and the GLT will not 
have further unintended consequences. 
The Implementation Objection raises issues of a more complex nature. According 
to this objection, any policy recommendation being put forward as a solution to the 
problem of global poverty must not only be within the scope of international politics as it 
 20 
operates today, but it should also be easy to put in practice. In other words, it must pertain 
to the discipline of political science rather than science fiction. The fact that the tax of the 
GLT is miniscule goes some way towards alleviating some concerns one may have. Of 
course one could still object that what are luxuries for some are necessities for others, 
therefore taxing luxuries is potentially unfair to those who have no choice in the matter. 
The GLT gets around this objection by introducing the distinction between the Universal 
GLT, which applies to everyone across the globe, and the Partial GLT, which applies 
only to certain areas of the globe where the GDP is above a certain threshold. 
Unlike Pogge’s GRD, the GLT is not vulnerable to certain implementation 
objections, such as: How can we identify the relevant sum of economic value of any 
given resource that the tax would be applied to? At which point of the primary production 
should the tax be applied? How can we generate enough goodwill among rich nation-
states that they would be willing to commit themselves to supranational institutional 
reforms?15 The GLT imposes a tax based on consumption. This means that we don’t need 
to get involved with the difficult question of quantifying the economic value of a 
resource. All is required is to come up with an (admittedly arbitrary) amount for this tax. 
For example, we suggested US$5 for each economy-class air ticket. Of course this 
amount can be revised, but as long as it is inconspicuous and will not be resented by the 
consumers, it can be more or less than the US$5 being suggested. Since the tax applies at 
the point of consumption rather than production, we don’t have to worry about the 
complexities of the production process. The tax will be paid by the consumers at the 
moment they pay for the goods they purchase. When it comes to solving the problem of 
global poverty, issues regarding the goodwill of rich nation-states will never go away, 
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since rich nations are not only responsible for the poverty but they also stand to lose most 
from any solution to the problem. Yet the GLT does not need the compliance of nation-
states, since the international organization responsible for collecting the GLT will deal 
directly with the multinationals that produce the goods being taxed, without having to go 
through any intermediate third-party. The issue of natural resources is of course a much 
more complex issue, since sovereign states will claim to have a right over their natural 
resources. The fact that the GLT is not taxing natural resources makes it possible to get 
around this potential stumbling block.  
 There are, however, two further issues regarding the implementation of the GLT 
that need to be considered: How can we be sure that the exact amount will be paid to the 
global fund? What punishment can be meted out if those who are supposed to pay fail or 
refuse to do so? 
The items listed as susceptible for a GLT are chosen in part with an eye to what is 
practical in terms of collecting the tax. There are many goods that qualify as a luxury 
which will not be taxed, merely because it would be much messier to know with any 
precision how many goods were in fact consumed. Hence, we are suggesting taxing air-
travel rather than caviar, texting via mobile-phone rather than e-mails, procreation rather 
than champagne, etc. The point is that it would be extremely easy to have access to the 
information concerning the consumption of luxury goods being taxed. Statistics on air 
travel, financial transactions, babies born and even texting are readily available. This is in 
part because the manufacturers or service providers not only declare their output, but 
have an incentive to boost their numbers. When an air carrier reports back to their 
shareholders, they will have an incentive to show that passenger numbers on their airline 
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carriers have gone up compared to the previous year. So the statistics on air-travel exist 
already. The expectation is for the GLT to be passed on directly to the consumers, so that 
the private companies selling a good being taxed by the GLT will not be effected by this 
tax. As for procreation, anyone in the process of giving birth will have other things on 
their mind than the GLT, so it is unlikely that they will object to a minimal flat tax. Not 
to mention the fact that compared to the cost of raising a child, the flat tax imposed by the 
GLT is almost laughably small. 
Finally, what can be done if the multinationals involved decide to pocket the GLT 
and not pass it on to the global fund? We believe that this is highly unlikely, since the 
risk of being ‘named and shamed’ would not make it worth their while. The harm to the 
reputation of a company that kept the revenue of a GLT meant to fight global poverty 
would be so great that it would be irrational for any company to entertain that thought, 
even in the cut-throat competitive world we live in. However, in order to give an 
incentive to these companies to pass on the GLT to the global fund, we could agree that 
these companies get to keep 10% of the funds being raised through the GLT. This would 




There is a tendency in academic circles for scholars to present their ideas as radical and 
original alternatives to the existing body of literature. Academics feel compelled to 
dismiss all competing ideas before offering their preferred solution to a specific problem. 
This tendency is unhelpful and should be resisted. In this paper we put forward a policy 
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that we believe could contribute to the fight against world poverty, the GLT. We are not 
suggesting that this is the only or even the best solution to the problem. Instead, we 
believe that the most effective approach to the problem of global poverty requires 
tackling the problem via a whole range of different measures, from reforming the 
international tax regime to taxing natural resources to reforming the global rules that 
dictate the interactions between nations at a political and economic level. The GLT is 
simply one measure amongst many others that can deliver for the global poor. 
 We have also argued that to be taken seriously, any policy recommendation has to 
respond to two possible objections, namely the Unforeseen Consequences Objection and 
the Implementation Objection. We believe that the GLT deals adequately with these 
objections, and it has some advantages respect other possible solutions to the problem of 
global poverty. But of course there is still much work to be done. Raising the funds to 
fight global poverty is a huge challenge, but even if one were to succeed on that front, 
another issue arises around the fairness and practicality of distributing the funds. How to 
distribute the resources in the Global Poverty Fund raises more difficulties than raising 
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1 The same intuition can be found in Thomas Paine’s Agrarian Justice, written in 1795. 
2 Two other factors mentioned by the World Bank are adverse weather conditions and 
Asia’s strong demand for food imports. 
3 The World Bank. Press Release No:2012/411/PREM. 
4 See Daniel Butt (2009) and Spinner-Halev (2012). 
5 For a defence of the opposite view, namely that past wrongs should not be rectified, see 
Perez (2012). 
6 According to Thomas Pogge $506 billion per annum would suffice to help the 3.08 
billion people (47 percent of world population) who currently live below $2.50 per day. 
See the interview with Pogge on Policy Innovations, 31 May, 2011: 
http://www.policyinnovations.org/ideas/briefings/data/000201 
7 The history of the concept of taxation, and the justice of a progressive taxation, are 
perfectly captured by Helmut P. Gaisbauer, Gottfried Schweiger and Clemens Sedmak 
(2013). 
8 The idea of air-ticket taxation to pay for climate change has been raised before. The 
International Institute for Environment and Development calculates that a small tax of 
just US6$ per economy-class ticket and US$62 for business class tickets could generate 
as much as US$10 Billion. See Tom Birch and Muyeye Chambwera, ‘Fundraising 
Flights: A Levy on International Air Travel for Adaptation’, IIED, March 2011.  
9 For an endorsement of the Tobin Tax, see Brock (2008). 
 27 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 There is of course a serious problem with relying too much on GDP as an indicator of 
poverty, especially in poor countries – see Morten Jerven, ‘Lies, Damn Lies and GDP’, 
The Guardian, 20 November 2012. 
11 See also Casal and Williams (2004). 
12 ‘Digital Revolution Lights up Africa with Maps, Mobiles, Money and Markets’, The 
Guardian, Tuesday 30 October 2012. 
13 ‘Africa’s Apps: Farming to Gaming’, The Guardian, Tuesday 30 October 2012.  
14 RTE News, Tueday 26 September 2006.  
15 For incisive critiques of the GRD, see Fuller (2008); Hayward (2005); Haubrich 
(2004).  
 
 
